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I. Introduction
The year 2006 may with hindsight be remembered
as the watershed in climate policy, the year when
the knowledge of the grim realities of climate
change eventually trickled down from the elusive
towers of the natural sciences into the societal and
political spheres. This was partially due to the pub-
lication of the proceedings of the ‘Exeter Con-
ference’, which transferred the notions of ‘non-lin-
ear developments’ and ‘tipping points’ of the
Earth’s ecosystems into popular knowledge.1 Since
the year 2006 it is thus widely known that large,
vulnerable and vital ecosystems such as the arctic
ice sheets or the tropical rainforests of the Amazon
and Congo may be at risk of sudden collapse. The
watershed was exacerbated by the publication of
former World Bank economist Sir Nicholas Stern’s
‘Review on the Economics of Climate Change’,
which had been commissioned by the British gov-
ernment.2 This comprehensive economic assess-
ment of climate change put the costs of avoidance
and mitigation much lower than the potential cat-
astrophic losses of unmitigated warming.3
The expectations by the global public were thus
running high for the United Nations climate
change conference in Nairobi, Kenya. The twelfth
Conference of the Parties to the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) (COP 12)
and the second Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol (MOP 2)4 took place from 6 to 17
November 2006 and there was much hope by the
general public that the summit would be charac-
terised by a renewed sense of urgency and seri-
ousness. Nothing could have been further from
what happened, however. Although a sense of
urgency was present in many delegates individual-
ly, the conference proceeded with its usual diplo-
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Coming at the end of a year where public awareness of climate change had reached
unprecedented heights, there was much hope by the general public that the United
Nations climate change conference in Nairobi would be characterised by a renewed
sense of urgency and seriousness. However, although a sense of urgency was present in
many delegates individually, the conference proceeded with its usual diplomatic ritual
at an almost surrealistic slow pace, apparently unaffected by time pressure. While it did
see some progress on important issues for developing countries such as the Adaptation
Fund, the Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability, and Adaptation to
Climate Change, and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), on questions regarding
the future of the regime it proved to be at best a confidence-building session that served
to hear further views. More serious work on the future of the regime can – and must –
therefore be expected of the next Conferences of the Parties. 
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matic ritual at an almost surrealistic slow pace,
apparently unaffected by time pressure. 
Nevertheless, the location of the conference in
Nairobi, Kenya, certainly moved Africa into the
spotlight of the climate policy process. The conti-
nent emits relatively few anthropogenic green-
house gases but will be severely hit by the impacts
of global warming. 
Some of these effects were noticed by those par-
ticipants who travelled to Lake Nakuru (completely
dry) and Lake Naivasha (water level a few meters
lower than normal). The greater Horn of Africa first
saw record droughts and, right during the time of
the conference, heavy flooding. The snow and ice
caps on Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Kenya are
predicted to disappear within a few decades, which
will cause severe water shortages for the region.
Setting up the climate summit in Nairobi therefore
raised expectations that, first, the necessity for mit-
igation would receive renewed acknowledgement
and, second, that industrialised countries would
lend stronger support to Africa, and Southern coun-
tries in general, to help adapt to the impacts of glob-
al warming.
Although the conference in Nairobi did not
develop into ‘the Africa conference’ as envisioned
by some, it did see some progress on important
issues for developing countries such as the Adap-
tation Fund, the Nairobi Work Programme on
Impacts, Vulnerability, and Adaptation to Climate
Change, and the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM). On questions regarding the future of the
regime, however, it proved to be at best a confi-
dence-building session that served to hear further
views. 
II. The Post-2012 process on 
future commitments
Nairobi saw the continuation of negotiations on the
future of the climate regime regarding the time
after the expiry of the first commitment period of
the Kyoto Protocol in 2012. The Parties to the FCCC
and to the Kyoto Protocol had launched two negoti-
ating processes in Montreal in 2005.5
First, the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol had estab-
lished an Ad-hoc Working Group (AWG) on further
commitments for Annex I Parties pursuant to
Article 3.9 KP, which stipulates that the MOP is to
initiate considerations on post-2012 commitments
for Annex I Parties at least seven years before the
end of the first commitment period, thus in 2005
(see section II.1).
Second, Parties to the FCCC in Montreal
launched a ‘dialogue’ under the Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change in the hope of integrat-
ing large developing countries and the United
States, who has refused to ratify Kyoto, in construc-
tive discussions on the future of the climate regime.
The ‘dialogue on long-term cooperative action to
address climate change by enhancing implementa-
tion of the convention’ is not supposed to prejudice
‘any future negotiations, commitments, process,
framework or mandate under the Convention’ and
is rather ‘an open and non-binding exchange of
views [ . . . ] and will not open to any negotiations
leading to new commitments.’6 (see section II.3)
In Nairobi, two new items relevant to the post-
2012 regime, namely a review of the Kyoto Protocol
under its Article 9 (see section II.2) and the Russian
proposal on voluntary commitments (see section
II.4), were put on the agenda. 
1. Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties
under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG)
Timely negotiations on post-2012 commitments are
essential. Any amendment to the Kyoto Protocol
will have to be ratified by at least three-fourths of
the Parties in order to come into effect.7 This will
probably require two to three years and thus nego-
tiations would have to be finalised at the latest by
2009 in order to avoid a gap between the first and
second commitment period.
In Nairobi, following a workshop to explore the
scientific basis of further commitments, the Parties
discussed several points raised by their Chair
Michael Zammit Cutajar for further consideration:
the work programme of the AWG, sending an
encouraging message to the outside world, a longer-
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term vision for possible aspiration for the work to
achieve the principles of the Convention, and the
duration of the commitment period. 
After a number of informal consultations and
bilateral meetings, the Parties again could not agree
on a specific timeline.8 The developing countries
(G77 and China) had demanded that negotiations
on further commitments for Annex I Parties should
be concluded by 2008 while the industrialised
countries had stressed the necessity of receiving
more information about important factors to be
provided by not only Parties but by other organisa-
tions, including the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) and the International
Energy Agency (IEA). The intentions underlying
both positions are not difficult to decipher. The
industrialised countries intended to put the negoti-
ations on Articles 3.9 and 9 into one package to
negotiate a ‘broader participation’ in the regime.
This included strengthened action by the major
developing countries or a condition for taking on
any new and strengthened commitments under
Article 3.9 KP. Developing countries wanted Annex
I Parties to take the lead by determining their fur-
ther commitments in the AWG first before negoti-
ating future commitments for themselves. They
therefore insisted that the negotiations on future
targets for the industrialised countries and the
broader review of the Protocol be kept separate.
The Parties did manage to agree on a work pro-
gramme to (a) conduct an analysis of mitigation
potentials and ranges of emission reduction objec-
tives of Annex I Parties, (b) analyse possible means
to achieve mitigation objectives, and (c) consider
further commitments by Annex I Parties. In 2007,
the AWG will focus on the first point. Its third ses-
sion at the twenty-sixth meeting of the COP’s sub-
sidiary bodies (SB 26) in May 2007 will be devoted
to a roundtable discussion based on submissions by
Parties. These submissions should contain informa-
tion and views on mitigation potentials, effective-
ness, efficiency, and costs and benefits of current
and future policies as well as measures and tech-
nologies at the disposal of Annex I Parties. The
fourth session of the AWG is scheduled later this
year in conjunction with the fourth session of the
‘dialogue’. 
With regards to the message to the outside
world, while the EU and G77/China had attempted
to send a clear signal of continuation to the grow-
ing emissions trading market, Japan repeated that
key elements of the Kyoto Protocol must be
reviewed before making any decisions on the con-
tinuation of the Kyoto mechanisms and insisted
that industrial stakeholders should bear the risk of
the continuation of the international carbon mar-
ket. The conclusion thus only underscores ‘the need
for the energetic and timely pursuit of its work pro-
gramme so as to send a clear message that Annex I
parties to the Kyoto Protocol are taking the lead in
the mitigation effort by taking action to maintain
their overall emissions on a declining trend beyond
2012 through their domestic and international
efforts, (which) will also give a clear signal to eco-
nomic actors about the continuity of the interna-
tional carbon market’.9
As regards the long-term vision, the EU attempt-
ed to insert the objective to keep the temperature
increase below 2°C, but this was opposed by
G77/China. After much controversy in the contact
group, the final conclusions do not contain the tar-
get date set out originally for halving global GHG
emissions, which was the year 2050. Instead, the
AWG merely considered ‘the information that,
according to the scenarios of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change Third Assessment Report,
global emissions of carbon dioxide have to be
reduced to very low levels, well below half of levels
in 2000, in order to stabilise their concentrations in
the atmosphere’.10
2. Article 9 KP: review of the 
Kyoto Protocol
Article 9 of the Kyoto Protocol prescribes a general
review of the adequacy of the Protocol at regular
intervals, with the first review starting at MOP 2.
The most contentious issues turned out to be 
the scope and duration of this first review and the
institutionalisation of further reviews. G77/China
argued that a review should focus on how well
8 The conclusion contains the same phrase as the Montreal deci-
sion establishing the AWG, i.e. that further sessions will be 
scheduled with a view to completing the work of the AWG as
early as possible and in time to ensure that there is no gap be-
tween the first and the second commitment periods under the
Kyoto Protocol, see Further commitments for Annex I Parties and
Programme of Work, Draft Conclusions, FCCC/KP/AWG/2006/L.4, 
14 December 2006.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
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industrialised countries are meeting their targets,
should be concluded at MOP 2 and that further
reviews should take place at intervals of three to
four years. The EU, supported by Switzerland and
Japan, proposed to start a review process culminat-
ing at MOP 3 with the aim of a comprehensive
assessment of all aspects of the Protocol and to con-
duct the second review two years after. 
Finally, Article 9 was brought up to the ministe-
rial level. The ministers agreed to conclude the first
review at MOP 2. The conclusions state that the
Kyoto Protocol ‘has initiated important action’
although some elements such as adaptation ‘could
be further elaborated upon’ and implementation
‘could be further enhanced.’11 Parties also agreed to
conduct the second review at MOP 4 in 2008, as the
industrialized countries had wanted, but with a
mandate ‘which shall not pre-judge action that may
be decided upon by the COP/MOP, and shall not
lead to new commitments for any Party’12, as devel-
oping countries had insisted. The scope and content
of the second review will be considered at MOP 3,
based on Parties’ submissions by 17 August 2007.
This decision in combination with the AWG
conclusions seems to close the window of op-
portunity to come to an agreement on future com-
mitments for industrialised countries or on broad-
er participation before 2008. The prevailing mood
at this conference was thus one of ‘passing the
baton’. Having said that, the review will be com-
prehensive – as demanded by industrialised coun-
tries – and will encompass all aspects of the 
Kyoto Protocol. Together with the results of the
Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC it has thus
the potential to provide the basis for a compre-
hensive agreement covering Annex I and non-
Annex I countries. 
3. Dialogue on long-term cooperative
action to enhance implementation 
of the Convention
There had been some expectation after COP 11 in
Montreal that the Convention track might provide
a forum for an open exchange of views and infor-
mation and could be a basis for the future negoti-
ation on broader participation.13 After a first
round of submissions by Parties and a first work-
shop held in May 2006, Nairobi saw the second
workshop of the Dialogue. Following presenta-
tions by economists such as Sir Nicholas Stern,
Parties exchanged their views on four themes:
advancing development goals in a sustainable way,
realising the full potential of market-based oppor-
tunities, addressing action on adaptation and real-
ising the full potential of technology. Highlights
included China’s presentation on its domestic cli-
mate protection efforts, Brazil’s proposal to assist
developing countries in reducing emissions from
deforestation by providing financial incentives in
the form of payments from developed countries,
and South Africa’s proposal for developing coun-
tries to commit to Sustainable Development
Policies and Measures. 
Despite its innovative format, the dialogue al-
ready seems to have run out of momentum. Parties
spent little energy on it, perhaps because it is not a
formal negotiation process. 
The third workshop has been scheduled for May
2007 in Bonn, focusing on addressing action on
adaptation and realising the full potential of tech-
nology. The fourth workshop will be held between
sessions, most likely in September 2007. The FCCC
secretariat will prepare an analysis of existing and
planned financial flows related to climate change
by the fourth session.14
4. The Russian proposal on voluntary
commitments
In Montreal, Russia had proposed to establish a
procedure for recognising voluntary commitments
from Non-Annex I Parties to the Protocol. Based on
inter-sessional consultations, the Russian Federa-
tion called for a MOP decision to launch a negotia-
tion process under the Subsidary Body for Imple-
mentation (SBI). Fearing a new arena for negotia-
tions of developing country commitments, this pro-
posal was opposed by the G77/China who stated
that there was no mandate to negotiate this item at 
MOP 2. After much debate, the issue was taken to
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14 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twelfth session,
held at Nairobi from 6 to 10 November 2006,
FCCC/CP/2006/5, 26 January 2007.
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the ministerial level, which led to a compromise to
convene a workshop in May 2007 to clarify and ex-
plore the scope and implications of the proposal.15
III. Belarus proposal to take 
on commitments
Belarus is an Annex I Party but was not assigned a
commitment under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol
since it was not a Party to the FCCC in 1997.16 In
Nairobi, Belarus proposed to take on a 5 % reduc-
tion target relative to 1990 levels. The proposal,
however, faced opposition from all sides for several
reasons: Firstly, the scientific basis for a 5 % reduc-
tion commitment for Belarus was not clear. Second,
this commitment would grant ‘hot air’, i.e. excess
emission certificates not resulting from active cli-
mate policy, to Belarus since its emissions have
already fallen by about 40 % below 1990 levels.17
After a number of informal consultations, Belarus
accepted a target of 8 % reduction with further con-
ditions, including a requirement of holding 7 % of
its allowance in reserve in addition to the normal 
5 % reserve, and a commitment to use any proceeds
from emissions trading for emission abatement
measures.18
This decision constitutes the adoption of the first
amendment to the Kyoto Protocol. However, the
amendment will come into effect only if it is rati-
fied by three-fourths of the Kyoto Parties.19 Since
the EU clearly stated that its Member States would
not ratify the amendment, the decision is unlikely
to actually enter into force.
IV. Deforestation 
20-25 % of global emissions result from deforesta-
tion, but so far neither the Convention nor the
Protocol have adequately addressed these emis-
sions. A joint submission by Papua New Guinea and
Costa Rica at COP 11 in Montreal emphasised the
need for innovative approaches in this area.20 They
proposed a ‘fair and equitable access to carbon mar-
kets’ as a condition for substantial engagement and
made two suggestions: either to elaborate an
optional Protocol under the Climate Convention or
to make forest conservation activities eligible under
the CDM.21
In Montreal, all Parties had welcomed the gener-
al intention of the proposal, while some raised tech-
nical concerns to address deforestation emissions
without creating another loophole in the climate
regime, such as how to set the baselines or targets,
which areas to include, or how to monitor and ver-
ify the benefits achieved. In a workshop earlier in
2006, Brazil had submitted a competing proposal
according to which countries would not get emis-
sion credits for reducing deforestation but pay-
ments from an international fund financed by the
industrialised countries.
In Nairobi, the G77/China and the EU were in
favour of the Brazilian proposal. The US was very
reluctant to negotiate, insisting that a multitude of
technical questions needed to be resolved. The
Parties finally agreed to hold a second workshop on
this issue in early 2007. Issues to be discussed are
possible positive incentives to prevent deforesta-
tion as well as technical and methodological re-
quirements for their implementation. 
V. Adaptation
After some initial neglect in the first years of the cli-
mate regime, adaptation to the adverse effects of
climate change gained considerable momentum at
COP 9 in Milan 2003, where the Parties agreed on a
comprehensive approach. At COP 10 the Parties
adopted the ‘Buenos Aires Programme of Work 
on Adaptation and Response Measures’.22 It called
15 Conclusions on the report of the President on consultations con-
cerning the proposal of the Russian Federation. Proposal by the
President, FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/L.6, 17 November 2006.
16 See Oberthür/Ott, The Kyoto Protocol, International Climate
Policy for the 21st Century, Berlin, Heidelberg et al. 1999, 
p. 155.
17 Report of the individual review of the greenhouse gas inventory
of the Republic of Belarus submitted in 2005,
FCCC/ARR/2005BLR, 24 March 2006.
18 Decision 10/CMP.2, Proposal from Belarus to amend Annex B to
the Kyoto Protocol, FCCC/KP/CMP7/2006/10/Add.1, 26 January
2007 (Advance version).
19 Supra note 7.
20 Supra note 5, p. 93.
21 Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries:
approaches to stimulate action, Submissions from Parties,
FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1, 11 November 2005.
22 Decision 1/CP.10, Buenos Aires programme of work on adapta-
tion and response measures, FCCC/CP/2004/10/Add.1, 19 April
2005; see also Ott/Brouns/Sterk/Wittneben, ‘It takes two to
tango: Climate Policy at COP 10 in Buenos Aires and Beyond’,
JEEPL 2005, pp. 84-91.
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on the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Tech-
nological Advice (SBSTA) to develop a five-year
programme of work on scientific, technical and
socio-economic aspects of vulnerability and adapta-
tion to climate change. This programme of work
was adopted at COP 11 in Montreal.23
To achieve the aims of the programme, SBSTA 23
in Montreal had elaborated a seven-page draft
indicative list of activities for information gather-
ing, analysis and dissemination.24 While SBSTA 24
(May 2006 in Bonn) failed to completely agree on
the list, Parties nevertheless decided to launch the
activities under the programme and to complete
the list at SBSTA 25 in Nairobi.
MOP 2 in Nairobi finally agreed on the initial
activities to be undertaken in the first two years of
the programme of work. The very comprehensive
programme, now renamed the ‘Nairobi Work Pro-
gramme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation
to Climate Change’, includes submissions, work-
shops and expert meetings; deliverables include
synthesis reports, technical papers, progress reports
and a web-based interface.
The other key issue on the adaptation agenda in
Nairobi was the establishment of the Adaptation
Fund (AF), which had been agreed upon at COP 7
in Marrakesh and established at MOP 1. It will 
be funded from a 2 % levy on the issuance of
Certified Emission Reductions under the CDM.
However, the fund has so far not been opera-
tionalised due to disagreement regarding its insti-
tutional setup. The EU and other industrialised
countries prefer to hand over the operation to the
Global Environment Facility (GEF), the entity
already in charge of operating the climate regime’s
Special Climate Change Fund and Least Developed
Countries Fund. 
According to its mandate, the GEF finances only
‘agreed incremental costs’ that arise if a local,
national or regional development project is made to
also yield global environmental benefits. Activities
therefore require co-financing and in particular
LDCs and Small Island Developing States (SIDS)
fear that this obligation is favouring countries that
already receive the bulk of foreign direct invest-
ment or Official Development Assistance (ODA)
flowing to the South. Further conflicts arose from
the adoption of a Resource Allocation Framework
(RAF) in 2005 that earmarks funds according to an
index of the potential of countries to generate glob-
al environmental benefits and an index of coun-
tries’ performance in implementing GEF projects.
While the RAF in principle only applies to the
GEF’s own funding, which is distinct from the
funds of the climate regime, some developing coun-
tries fear that these criteria will eventually come to
apply to all GEF financing.
Furthermore, since most of the resources for the
AF will probably not come from donor countries
but from the CDM, developing countries question
the legitimacy of the GEF, where donor govern-
ments play a dominant role, to handle this fund.
Also, the substantial political power that the US can
exercise in the decision-making processes at the
GEF could make this body inappropriate for man-
aging a fund that is driven by the Kyoto Protocol,
which the US has not ratified. 
By contrast, the EU supports the location of the
fund in the GEF in order to ensure that project
activities are coordinated with the other financial
mechanisms of the climate regime (Least Devel-
oped Country Fund and Special Climate Change
Fund) and is also in favour of the co-financing
requirement.
In Nairobi, Parties agreed to first address the
AF’s overarching principles, modalities and gover-
nance before addressing institutional arrange-
ments. They finally resolved that funding shall be
on a full adaptation cost basis, that the Fund’s 
governing body shall be composed only of Parties
to the Kyoto Protocol, follow the ‘one-country-one-
vote’ rule, and have a majority of developing 
countries in the fund´s decision-making body. The
SBI is to further elaborate on eligibility criteria,
priority areas and institutional arrangements for
consideration at MOP 3.25 Since the GEF is cur-
rently undergoing great restructuring, the hope is
that an overall structure will emerge that will allow
for a fund as defined by the guidance from Nairobi
to be established to everyone’s satisfaction within
the GEF. The MOP has thus invited institutions 
to submit their views on how they would opera-
tionalise this decision.26 Another reason for the
delay in setting up the fund has been because con-
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26 Ibid.
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sensus within G77/China still has to be established
regarding eligibility criteria and other issues.
VI. The project-based mechanisms:
Clean Development Mechanism
and Joint Implementation
1. The Clean Development Mechanism
The CDM allows industrialised countries to acquire
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) generated by
climate protection projects in developing countries
and count these towards their Kyoto targets.
Especially in the year 2006, the CDM has been
expanding rapidly and there are currently more
than 1,500 projects at least at the validation stage,
exceeding even the most optimistic estimates of the
CDM Executive Board (EB).27 Parties thus acknowl-
edged the EB’s work as a great success.
However, CDM projects are so far mainly con-
centrated in a few countries, notably Brazil, China,
India, and Mexico, which account for about 3/4 of
all projects currently in the pipeline. This issue had
already been raised at MOP 1 in Montreal, which
had requested the EB to develop recommendations
on how to improve the CDM’s geographical distri-
bution.28 Negotiations in Nairobi focused on one 
of the EB’s suggestions, a facility or facilities to 
promote capacity building and project preparation
in countries that have so far been left out of 
the CDM process. The idea was strongly supported
by the group of African countries and Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) but opposed by the
industrialised countries who did not want yet
another financial mechanism at international level.
Parties finally compromised on language encour-
aging Annex I Parties ‘to consider further initia-
tives, including financial support‘ for the identifi-
cation and development of CDM projects especial-
ly in LDCs, African countries, and small island
developing states.29
Another highly controversial issue in this context
was projects that reduce the use of non-sustainable
biomass, i.e. biomass that is used at a rate faster
than the natural replacement rate, e.g. by increasing
the efficiency of biomass use or replacing it with
solar cookers. In 2005, the EB had deleted refer-
ences to this project type from the small-scale
methodologies, thus effectively blocking them. On
the insistence of LDC countries MOP 1 had asked
the EB to revisit the issue, but the Board was unable
to come to an agreement and had therefore referred
the problem back to the MOP. In Nairobi, MOP 2
was equally unable to resolve the issue and there-
fore invited Parties, intergovernmental organisa-
tions and non-governmental organisations to sub-
mit new proposals for methodologies to the EB. The
EB is to make a recommendation on a new method-
ology to MOP 3.30
Concerning the issue of whether the carbon cap-
ture and storage (CCS) technology can be applied in
a CDM project, a number of methodological, politi-
cal and legal questions were raised. These include
the definition of the project boundary, leakage, the
permanence of the sequestration, and responsibili-
ty after the crediting period of the CDM project
ends. The EU, Canada, China, India, Japan, South
Africa and especially the OPEC countries clearly
supported to include CCS under the CDM, but 
the EU amongst other countries highlighted that
the above mentioned issues first needed to be re-
solved. Other countries such as the LDCs, the Al-
liance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and Brazil
voiced serious concerns about the maturity and
appropriateness of CCS. Parties compromised on a
two-year process of further negotiations under the
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological
Advice (SBSTA), with a view to taking a final deci-
sion at MOP 4.31
The MOP also had the issue of CDM projects that
reduce emissions of HFC-23 on its agenda. HFC-23
is a by-product in the production of hydrochloro-
fluorocarbon 22 (HCFC-22), a refrigerant governed
by the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer. HFC-23 incineration at
existing production sites can already generate
CERs, but the EB had requested guidance from the
MOP on whether incineration at new facilities was
also permitted under the CDM. Since HFC-23 CDM
projects are quite profitable with costs of only
about USD 0.50 per CO2 equivalent tonne of 
HFC-23 avoided, there are concerns that permitting
27 Fenhann, Joergen (2006): CDM pipeline overview, updated 1
February 2006: www.cd4cdm.org.
28 Supra note 5, pp. 97-99.
29 Decision 1/CMP.2, Further guidance relating to the clean 
development mechanism, FCCC/KP/CMP7/2006/10/Add.1, 
26 January 2007 (Advance version).
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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such projects would create a perverse incentive to
increase production of HCFC-22 for the sole pur-
pose of generating CERs. 
Negotiations focussed on a proposal to establish
a system by which the CERs would be issued to an
institution other than the project participants. The
institution would sell a fraction of the CERs to
reimburse the project participants’ incremental
costs incurred from destroying the HFC-23. How-
ever, while most Parties supported issuing the CERs
to an international institution and either cancelling
them or using them to fund activities to phase out
the production and consumption of HCFCs alto-
gether, China wanted the CERs to be issued to the
host country government and to be used for ‘other
activities beneficial for the global environment’.
The discussion therefore had to be deferred to
SBSTA 26 in May 2007.
2. Joint Implementation
In contrast to the controversies surrounding the
CDM, negotiations about Joint Implementation (JI),
under which Annex I Parties can acquire emission
reduction units (ERUs) generated by greenhouse
gas mitigation projects in other Annex I Parties,
were largely uncontroversial. MOP 1 had estab-
lished the Joint Implementation Supervisory Com-
mittee (JISC) that oversees the implementation of
the JI 2nd track and tasked it to make the mecha-
nism operational within the year.32 The JISC had
met this challenge and already launched the 2nd
track verification procedure in October 2006. How-
ever, the future work is currently endangered by a
shortfall of more than 2 million USD the JISC faces
for 2007. The JI mechanism will start yielding rev-
enues for its operation only in 2008. In the mean-
time it relies on funding from the Parties to the
Protocol, which has so far not come forward to the
extent necessary. The MOP therefore urged Parties
to make further financial contributions for the
operation of the JISC.33
VII. Technology transfer 
According to Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC and Article
10(c) of the Kyoto Protocol, Annex II industrialised
countries are committed to promote, facilitate and
finance the transfer of technology in order to speed
up the diffusion of emission reduction and adapta-
tion technology. The Marrakesh Accords have 
put in place a framework that is to implement 
activities to determine and evaluate technology
needs, exchange technological information, create a
favourable framework, particularly in countries
with economies in transition and developing coun-
tries, build technical capacity and put in place tech-
nology transfer mechanisms. The funding for the
framework derives mainly from the GEF and from
the Special Climate Change Fund.
Negotiations in Nairobi focused on the future
mandate of the Expert Group on Technology
Transfer (EGTT), which is undertaking analytical
work and whose mandate expired at this session.
Developing countries strongly called for replacing it
with a new and stronger body, a so-called Tech-
nology Transfer and Development Board, and to
also establish a Multilateral Technology Acquisition
Fund to buy intellectual property rights. These 
proposals were opposed by the developed countries
that instead argued for continuing and strengthen-
ing the EGTT. Parties were unable to bridge 
this division and finally decided to extend the man-
date of EGTT for one year and continue discussions
at SB 26.34
VIII. Conclusions and ways forward 
The 2006 climate conference (COP 12 / MOP 2) 
in Nairobi certainly will not be remembered as 
a ‘great’ conference, but as one that largely failed to
address the challenges posed by accelerating 
climate change. The slow progress of the climate
negotiations is increasingly out of step with the
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32 The JI 2nd track is essentially a fall-back mechanism for JI host
countries that do not fulfil all the eligibility criteria for parti-
cipating in the flexible mechanisms established by the Marra-
kesh Accords. These criteria mostly relate to the existence of
rigorous emission inventories. Host countries that meet all 
criteria qualify for the JI 1st track under which they can define
the approval process of projects themselves. Countries that meet
only a reduced set of criteria can only use the JI 2nd track,
which requires a more complex international approval proce-
dure similar to the CDM overseen by the JISC.
33 Decision 2/CMP.2, Implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, FCCC/KP/CMP7/2006/10/Add.1, 26 January 2007
(Advance version); Decision 3/CMP.2, Guidance on the imple-
mentation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, FCCC/KP/CMP7/
2006/10/Add.1, 26 January 2007 (Advance version).
34 Decision 5/CP.12, Development and transfer of technologies,
FCCC/CP/2006/5/Add. 1, 26 January 2007 (Advance version).
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rising urgency of the climate problem. Despite
individual consciousness of the scale of the chal-
lenge, the collective wisdom of the negotiators
appeared to be at a rather low level. The AOSIS
countries were particularly frustrated because
even the 2°C target pronounced by the European
Union, which was not agreed by other developed
and developing countries in any case, will proba-
bly mean that many islands will be submerged by
the rising oceans. 
Nevertheless, the Nairobi conference did keep
the Kyoto process alive. The post-2012 negotiations
are continuing and will now include an analysis of
mitigation potentials. The Compliance Committee
successfully started its work, reported to the Parties
and adopted its Rules of Procedure. Many details
were accomplished that had been lingering in the
negotiations and that had been kept as potential
future bargaining chips. 
Furthermore, if all goes well, the first climate
conference in sub-Saharan Africa may have laid the
groundwork for a more comprehensive South-
North agreement in the years to come. MOP 2 re-
solved some issues that are important for Southern
countries, such as the Nairobi Work Programme on
Impacts, Vulnerability, and Adaptation to Climate
Change.
However, the European Union did not yet pro-
vide the kind of leadership role that is required if
the post-Kyoto negotiations are supposed to con-
clude successfully. There was still much finger
pointing and waiting for others to take the first
step. True, developing countries were demanding a
timetable for the AWG to agree on post-2012 com-
mitments for Annex I countries while refusing to
accept a timetable for the considerations in the
Article 9 review process. This is inconsistent and
obviously a negotiation strategy. But why did the
Union have to respond with the same measure –
demanding a timetable for the review process
while refusing a deadline for the AWG negotia-
tions? The EU countries still have room to reduce
GHG emissions, especially when they act as a bub-
ble and capitalise on the reduction potentials in
the countries with economies in transition. The EU
will only be able to build a ‘green coalition’ with
rapidly industrialising developing countries if it
demonstrates that it is doing its share. Since per
capita emissions in most industrialised countries
are still very high, this means that industrialised
countries are occupying other countries’ environ-
mental space.
At the present stage of the post-2012 negotia-
tions a good and timely outcome is still possible.
The work programme for the AWG has been adopt-
ed and contains the right agenda. The review of the
Protocol starts later than expected but will eventu-
ally lead to an evaluation in 2008. This sets the
stage for an adoption of the post-2012 regime in
2009 – very late because it will leave only two years
for ratification by three-fourths of the Parties until
2012. But it would still be feasible, given the neces-
sary political will. 
The situation is also more favourable because
the biggest player will enter the arena soon with 
a greatly enhanced positive attitude. Almost all
analysts agree that the position of the US admin-
istration will change after the next elections.
Climate change has already now become an is-
sue where potential candidates in the presidential
race compete on who has the best programmes.
Whether Republican or Democrat, no future Pre-
sident will be allowed to continue with the hostile
attitude of the present administration towards the
Kyoto Protocol and target-based commitments in
general.
This does not mean, however, that the US
administration will be ready to commit already in
2009. The new administration will assume power
in January 2009 and start the necessary research 
to determine the mitigation potentials and possi-
ble measures. The results may not be available by
the end of 2009 when the negotiations are sup-
posed to conclude. The ‘rest of the world’ thus may
have to agree on a post-2012 regime without a def-
inite commitment by the United States. It would
therefore be productive to start considering what
kind of signal from Washington might be suf-
ficient to make the rest of the world comfort-
able with going ahead without a full US reintegra-
tion into the climate regime for the time being.
And to also consider what could be ways to partly
reattach the US to the regime once US domestic
climate policy has been defined pending its full
reintegration. 
Again, as in 1997, the involvement of heads 
of state or government will be decisive.35 The
35 See supra note 16, pp. 85-91.
36 See Ott, ‘The Bonn Agreement to the Kyoto Protocol: Paving the
Way for Ratification’, International Environmental Agreements:
Politics, Law and Economics, 1, 2001, 4, pp. 469-476.
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same happened in 2001, when the Kyoto Proto-
col was rescued from the almost fatal blow it
received when George W. Bush announced his ‘op-
position’ to the Kyoto Protocol.36 The implications
of fighting climate change reach very far and too
many societal and economic interests are involved
to allow ministers taking the final decisions. As 
it was expressed by Kofi Annan in his address 
to the Nairobi meeting: ‘Global climate change
must take its place alongside those threats (con-
flict, poverty, the proliferation of deadly weapons)
that have traditionally monopolised first-order
political attention.’37
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37 www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10739.doc.htm.
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